Congress and the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy

Chapter 2 – Theory: Congressional Vote-Buying in Foreign Policy

I argue that bureaucratic fragmentation is a byproduct of bargaining in Congress. Legislators differ in their preferences over how and where foreign aid should be spent. Just like the preferences of legislators themselves, foreign aid bureaucracies differ in the way they spend foreign aid money, the interests they represent, and the oversight they face from political principals. Therefore, different legislators' preferences correspond to different agencies. Leaders wishing to set a foreign policy agenda, but lacking the support from their rank-and-file, may choose to support pet projects of recalcitrant legislators by funding their pet projects. Because of their specific bureaucratic preferences, many of these legislators will demand projects within specific agencies. The more pet projects are funded, the greater the fragmentation in the final bill.

This theory, which I call the vote-buying theory of bureaucratic fragmentation, suggests that fragmentation should increase when congressional interest and disunity are high. Leaders will only be willing to fund disparate pet projects when they are heavily invested in an area of foreign policy, and legislators will only demand pet projects in areas important to them and their constituents. Therefore, congressional interest is a necessary condition for vote-buying, and therefore, fragmentation. Additionally, leaders will only fund pet projects when they are having trouble collecting enough votes to pass their agenda. Therefore, congressional disunity is another necessary condition for fragmentation. I hypothesize that a combination of these two factors serves as a major source of bureaucratic fragmentation in foreign aid.

I contrast the vote-buying theory with two alternative explanations of bureaucratic fragmentation. First, scholars of congressional delegation might suggest that Congress purposefully undermines the bureaucracy when it doesn’t trust the executive branch to carry out its preferred policies. This would suggest that divided-party government would lead to a fragmented bureaucracy. Second, many foreign policy scholars believe that Congress has abdicated it role in foreign policy. This would suggest that congressional apathy leads to a poorly functioning bureaucracy. I develop testable hypotheses that differentiate between the vote-buying, delegation, and abdication theories of foreign policy fragmentation.

To test the hypotheses, I created several novel datasets to measure the dependent, and various independent, variables. I use these datasets in Chapters 3 and 4 of the book to quantitatively evaluate the three competing theories of bureaucratic fragmentation. In Chapter 3, I focus on the congressional disunity hypothesis by consider the heterogeneity of congressional moderates and the resulting vote-buying and fragmentation. In Chapter 4, I test the congressional interest hypothesis by measuring the salience of different policy areas and recipient countries and using USAID-reported aid data to determine the budgetary fragmentation for areas with high versus low congressional interest. Both quantitative chapters support the vote-buying theory, and neither provide any evidence for the delegation or abdication theories of bureaucratic fragmentation.

CHapter 3 – Congressional Disunity and Bureaucratic Fragmentation

In the first quantitative chapter, I test the congressional disunity hypothesis using a novel agency-level dataset of Foreign Operations Appropriations bills from 1961 to 2015. In line with the vote-buying theory of foreign policy fragmentation, I find that funding is more fragmented when congressional moderates—those whose preferences fall within the central wing of Congress—are more heterogeneous. This provides evidence that congressional leadership is fragmenting bureaucratic appropriations in order to appease congressional moderates and drive support for a foreign aid bill.

In contrast, I find no evidence for the delegation or abdication hypotheses in this chapter. Fragmentation is no lower during times of unified party government. It also does not decrease during times of war or during the Cold War, when interest in foreign policy should be higher. If anything, in fact, fragmentation increases during especially salient periods, providing further evidence of the vote-buying hypothesis.

Chapter 4 – Congressional Interest and Bureaucratic Fragmentation

The second quantitative chapter provides a quantitative test of the congressional interest hypothesis. In this chapter, I determine the recipient countries and policy areas in which US bureaucratic fragmentation is highest. I develop three novel measures of congressional interest in a given policy or country. First, I consider the amount of lobbying that has gone into the issue or country. Second, I count the number of Government Accountability Office auditing reports that Congress has requested in a given country. And third, I look at the congressional hearings that Congress has held on an issue.

As a dependent variable, I measure the fragmentation of the US bureaucracy working on a particular issue or country. In line with the vote-buying theory of bureaucratic fragmentation, and counter to the abdication theory, I find that places and issue areas in which Congress shows the most interest are also the most fragmented. This suggests that congressional interest is in fact a precondition for bureaucratic fragmentation.

In the three remaining chapters of the book, I select cases with varying levels of the two independent variables and causally trace the mechanisms leading from congressional interest and disunity to foreign aid fragmentation. The mechanisms support the causal processes expected in the vote-buying theory, and these chapters provide little evidence for any of the potential causal mechanisms of the delegation or abdication theories.

Chapter 5 – Bureaucracy Going to War: Nation-Building in Afghanistan

The reconstruction of Afghanistan after 9/11 offers an ideal opportunity to test the competing theoretical mechanisms. If the legislative and executive branches were ever to unite and create a coherent foreign policy agenda, it would be during the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Not only did this begin during an era of unified Republican control of both branches, it was also a moment of unprecedented bipartisanship. The war in Afghanistan was important to Congress, providing little incentive to abdicate or restrict delegation. However, the heterogeneity of congressional moderates in this time period was high as well. Therefore, this case provides clear measures of the independent variables, and an opportune place to test the competing hypotheses against one another.

I find that the bureaucratic fragmentation of the Afghanistan effort was consistently high and harmful to the Afghanistan campaign. Changes in congressional and presidential party had little effect on bureaucratic fragmentation. Through first- and second-hand accounts and congressional voting data, I provide strong evidence that Congress contributed to harmful bureaucratic fragmentation in Afghanistan. Congress exacerbated fragmentation not despite but because of its strong interest in the area. A combination of micromanaging by Congress and disunity within Congress led to a fragmented bureaucracy in Afghanistan, wasting tens of billions of dollars and putting American lives at risk.

Chapter 6 – Bureaucracy Going to Peace: Aid to Post-Soviet States

The end of the Cold War provides another opportunity to test the competing theories of foreign policy fragmentation. Once again, the fall of the Soviet Union offered Congress every incentive to create a clear, coherent foreign policy to ensure the democracy and survival of post-Soviet states. However, the first major aid project to former Soviet states, the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA), creating a messy, fragmented bureaucracy. I trace the mechanisms of this bureaucratic fragmentation and find that the failure of the FSA was a result of congressional vote-buying to entice moderate legislators to support a foreign policy agenda.

The new programs introduced in the FSA were disproportionately requested and supported by moderate legislators who were on the fence about the bill. Leadership in both the legislative and the executive branches were forced to fund a variety of new programs, in several agencies, that created a bureaucratic mess in the former Soviet Union. Once again, Congress was both very interested and very disunified in its preferences. This led to fragmentation and had policy consequences for decades to come.

Chapter 7 – A Success Story: Bureaucratic Coordination in the Fight Against AIDS and Malaria

In contrast to the two previous case studies, the final empirical chapter outlines a case of policy success. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was one area in which the US bureaucracy successfully united to carry out an aid agenda. In this chapter, I trace the mechanisms leading to its creation and eventual success. I find that Congress’s relative lack of interest in the issue of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa provided an opportunity for bureaucracies to work together and create better policy. In addition, most of the amendments and debates during these negotiations were ideological rather than distributive in nature, providing power to party blocs rather than individuals. Because there was little opportunity to lobby Congress for increased bureaucratic funding, bureaucracies instead lobbied each other. This lack of competition led to better communication and has provided one of the most prominent examples of foreign aid success in recent US history.